In February 2012, an already half-forgotten topic surfaced about the allegedly rigged presidential elections in 1996. Then the current head of state, Dmitry Medvedev, at a closed meeting in Gorki with representatives of the opposition, said: “It is unlikely that anyone has any doubts about who won the 1996 presidential election. It was not Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin.

Medvedev's words were voiced by the chairman of the "Russian National Union" Sergei Baburin, they were confirmed by a number of people present at the meeting. True, the official Kremlin disavowed the president's statement, noting that something completely different was meant.

According to some political analysts, perhaps Medvedev meant that then it was not Yeltsin who won, but the oligarchs. Nevertheless, the public began to actively discuss this topic, trying to find new evidence of the dishonesty of the 1996 elections and the illegitimacy of the Yeltsin presidency.

Hoping for a miracle

Recall that in the presidential elections in Russia in 1996, the struggle flared up between two candidates - Boris Yeltsin and Gennady Zyuganov. If in the first round, according to official data, the gap between Yeltsin and Zyuganov was small - 35.28% and 32.03%, then in the second round it is much more convincing - 53.82% versus 40.31%.

But even at the beginning of the year, in the popularity rating of candidates for the presidency, Yeltsin was only in 7th place: an incredible 25% separated him from the leader Zyuganov! Few people believed then in the probability of the victory of the incumbent president, but in a few weeks before the vote, the situation changed dramatically - Yeltsin's rating suddenly crept up.

However, this was not enough to win the elections, which was confirmed by the first round. Even on the eve of the second round, according to polls, Yeltsin at least did not have an advantage over the communist leader. All the more surprising is the final result of the presidential race.

Many then doubted the honesty of the elections. They complained about the notorious administrative resource, the dirty work of political technologists, fraud with ballots, and even interference in the American election campaign. So what is the secret of the “Yeltsin miracle”?

The Art of Manipulation

The fact that the main component of Yeltsin's success in the elections was the use of political technologies was one of the first to be stated by Alexander Oslon, who worked as part of the analytical group of the election headquarters of the first president of Russia. Months of work on the image of Boris Nikolayevich and the impact on the electorate under the slogan "prevention of communist restoration" have borne fruit.

Shortly after the elections, the Gleb Pavlovsky Effective Policy Foundation, which collaborated with Yeltsin's headquarters, published a report "The President in 1996: Scenarios and Technologies for Victory", which, according to Nezavisimaya Gazeta, "reveals the ingenious technology of manipulating public opinion and the original mechanism of political and ideological ahead of the competition."

The chief analyst of the NTV channel, Vsevolod Vilchek, admitted that Russian television actively used mind manipulation technologies in favor of Yeltsin. In particular, there was an emphasis on screening films like Cold Summer '53, which could create an atmosphere of anxiety and instill in people the need to take a more responsible approach to choosing a candidate. The audience did not even pay attention to the fact that nostalgic Soviet films disappeared from TV screens during the election campaign.

America will help us

“We considered it extremely important that Yeltsin win in 1996. It was a classic case of the ends justifying the means, and we achieved our goal,” said Thomas Graham, who worked as chief political analyst at the US Embassy in Moscow during the election period. A serious statement indicating that the Americans were at least going to influence the outcome of the Russian elections.

There are a number of facts supporting Graham's words. For example, a memo from the White House published by The Washington Times in March 1996. It talked about the intention of Yeltsin and Clinton to support each other in the re-election process, and there were quoted the words of Boris Nikolayevich, who urged the American president "to think about how to do it smartly."

Victory "with suffocation"

Despite the fact that observers from the OSCE, the European Parliament and the Council of Europe who were present at the elections recognized them as "free, impartial and fair", a number of experts say that these persons had an interest in Yeltsin's victory and could well turn a blind eye to minor violations.

LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky, State Duma Vice Speaker Lyubov Sliska and other Russian politicians voiced the opinion that the true results of at least the first round were different. Viktor Ilyukhin, when he was Chairman of the State Security Committee, stated that Zyuganov won in the first round, followed by Lebed, and only Yeltsin was in third place, but none of them received the required 50% plus one vote.

Russian sociologist Valentin Mikhailov conducted an independent statistical study of the results of the 1996 elections and noted that the ratio of votes cast for Yeltsin and Zyuganov in the first round differed from those in the second round. Mikhailov took the range of votes from 0.9 to 1.5% as the norm of fluctuations.

As a result, the researcher came to the conclusion that there is a suspicion that in at least 20 constituent entities of the Russian Federation, voters were pressured or the voting results were falsified. However, according to Mikhailov, in total they added no more than 900,000 votes, which cannot cast doubt on the election result. However, Zyuganov stated that, according to the conclusion of the court, 600,000 votes were taken away from him in Tatarstan alone.

Publicist Alexander Kireev, commenting on rumors of vote-rigging, draws attention to the fact that in those regions where the governors sympathized with Zyuganov, falsification in favor of Yeltsin would not be allowed. However, he still confirms the facts of violations. In his opinion, with a net count, Yeltsin's final victory would have been with a difference of not 13%, but 10% of the vote.

It is impossible not to take into account the fact that before the second round, Alexander Lebed declared his support for Yeltsin. Obviously, most of the 14.5% of the votes officially won by him in the first round went to Boris Nikolayevich. This was enough to tip the scales in favor of the first president of Russia.

The presidential elections of 1996 in Russia, which had not yet departed from the heavy veil of the communist past, seemed like a battle of the titans: among the main candidates were the leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation Gennady Zyuganov, the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party Vladimir Zhirinovsky and the current president of the new country Boris Yeltsin. They said that Yeltsin was tired and wanted to retire, they said that the Communists would definitely win the elections. Some believed that this was unacceptable, others that it was the only possible option. As a result, Yeltsin defeated Zyuganov by an incredible margin, and this outcome of the election campaign is still called one of the largest falsifications. So who did win the 1996 elections? Dilettant. media holds a second vote

Questions:

Why did Boris Yeltsin decide to participate in these elections?

Vadim Solovyov

As I understand it, Boris Nikolaevich was a representative of that part of the liberals who carried out gangster privatization, plundered the country and understood that if the communists won, an investigation would be carried out of all their actions. The main issue of the reforms carried out by Chubais was not that these reforms should be carried out, that the standard of living would rise, but that a layer of super-rich people should be created who would not allow the return of Soviet power. Therefore, Yeltsin had nowhere to go, he was a hostage of his own systems.

Dmitry Oreshkin

Boris Yeltsin was a very power-hungry man, and in 1996 he was not going to part with power. He understood that if the communists came to power, then everything he did would lose its meaning. He probably doubted, he had several options. Most likely, they put pressure on him, explaining that he would not win the elections, and something like a state of emergency should be introduced in the country, and power in the country should be kept by force. But he was not going to leave power.

Did he have a real chance of winning?

Vadim Solovyov

The West gave Yeltsin about $50 billion to carry out this election campaign. It is clear that in this situation, with such huge money aimed at bribing the media and artists, authorities who were completely used against Zyuganov, Yeltsin had every chance. Moreover, people had real hopes that Yeltsin, after the collapse of Soviet power, in the conditions of market relations, would quickly carry out reforms and lead the country out of a severe crisis.

Dmitry Oreshkin

He had a very difficult choice. At the beginning of the year, his ratings were less than 10 percent, the minimum in my memory among closed opinion polls was about 6 percent. He took a very big risk. Cancel the elections or trust Chubais, who believed that the elections could be won? He doubted this. But the fact that he must retain power in the country - no.

How strong were the communists?

Vadim Solovyov

Did Zyuganov really win and then give the victory to Yeltsin? Complete nonsense. I was deputy head of Zyuganov's headquarters for legal issues, and in the second round Yeltsin had already beaten Zyuganov by 10 million votes. The elections were rigged, but mostly with the help of the media, money and public opinion. A technology was applied when one candidate has material resources that are a hundred times greater than the resources of the second candidate. There was no equality, and people fell for Yeltsin and voted.

Dmitry Oreshkin

From the point of view of voters, they were, of course, weak. Then the country was still focused on seeking change. Then it was clear that it was necessary to switch to a market economy, that the Soviet market model, in other words, was at an impasse. This was clear to the people, and the Chekists, and members of the Central Committee, and Komsomol members, and ordinary communists, of whom there were 19 million. In this sense, if someone yearned for the USSR, then it was a minority. But there is such a thing as regional elites, and among them, just the same, there was an opposite feeling. They did not have such a keen understanding that it was impossible to live like this. In advanced centers, they understood that the Soviet project was not realized and did not justify itself. It was clear that the situation had to be changed, and Yeltsin was then a symbol of the new situation. But for the provincial elites, where there was no such acute feeling of lagging behind, where people lived off the kitchen garden, and continued to do so, where they did not care about the world market and hard currency, the mood was completely different. The local elites did not need any changes, “this Moscow nonsense”. They were psychologically far from these changes. Why, for example, Dagestan needs some kind of Europeanization? It was in such regions that Zyuganov had the majority. But the fact is that 3/4 of Russians live in cities, and they understood very clearly that they did not want to build communism. By majority vote, the country chose the path forward. Therefore, Russia, as an urban Europeanized entity, strove forward and achieved what it aspired to.

Would Zyuganov be a good president?

Vadim Solovyov

When we appealed the election results in 2004, one of the applicants was Irina Khakamada, Kiselyov, me. We drank tea at the buffet, and Khakamada said: the main mistake of the democrats is that in 1996 they bet on Yeltsin. "If we chose Zyuganov, we would have a normal democratic country, where there would be laws, free media, business would have worked, and there would have been no corruption, lawlessness and dictatorship, which today has left nothing of democracy.A paradoxical historical thing is that the main bearer of democracy is the communist Zyuganov.

In 1996, they became one of the most resonant political campaigns in the history of modern Russia. This was the only presidential election where the winner could not be determined without a second vote. The campaign itself was distinguished by a tough political struggle between the candidates. The main contenders for the victory were the future president of the country, Boris Yeltsin, and the leader of the communists, Gennady Zyuganov.

The situation before the elections

Presidential elections in 1996 were appointed by the Federation Council in December 1995. Elections were scheduled for June 16th. This happened literally on the eve of the completion of the elections to the State Duma. They were won by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, gaining 22% of the vote, the second place was taken by the liberal democrats, the Our Home is Russia movement, which supported Yeltsin, finished third with only 10% of the vote.

By 1996, not a trace remained of Yeltsin's popularity. In 1991, he won a landslide victory with over 57%. After 5 years, the people were depressed by the economic failures of the reforms carried out by the government, the protracted Chechen war, which brought a large number of victims, corruption scandals in the highest echelons of power. According to polls, the president's popularity was only 8-9%.

Collection of signatures

In the presidential elections of 1996, it was necessary to collect one million signatures in order for the CEC to register a candidate. Interestingly, the consent of the politician himself was not required for this. Therefore, the signing campaigns started around the New Year, while Yeltsin himself officially announced his nomination only in mid-February. At the same time, it became known that Zyuganov would represent the Communist Party of the Russian Federation in the 1996 presidential elections in Russia.

At that time, the advantage of the communist leader was obvious. They say that at the economic forum in Davos he was greeted as the likely favorite of the race.

In March, Yeltsin had to make a choice about how to campaign for the 1996 presidential election. It was possible to give everything at the mercy of the headquarters, which included officials and politicians, cancel the elections and declare a state of emergency in the country, which was advised by some close associates, or agree to the proposal of a number of big businessmen who offered to entrust the entire campaign to political technologists according to the Western model. Yeltsin took the third path.

The so-called Analytical Group headed by Chubais was formed. Large-scale studies were carried out, with the help of which it was possible to find out the most painful points of Russian society. On the basis of this study, the campaign for the 1996 presidential elections in the Russian Federation was conducted by Yeltsin's headquarters.

presidential candidates

Initially, 78 initiative groups announced their intention to run. But only 16 of them managed to collect the required one million signatures. Some refused to be nominated, like the head of the Nizhny Novgorod region, Boris Nemtsov, a few people supported other candidates, like a right-wing politician who called on supporters to vote for Zyuganov.

During the verification of the collected signatures by the CEC, seven were denied registration, two were able to prove their case in the Supreme Court. As a result, there were 11 candidates on the ballots for the 1996 presidential elections in Russia.

These were:

1. Entrepreneur Vladimir Bryntsalov, nominated by the Russian Socialist Party. Initially, he was denied registration, but he managed to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court.
2. Writer Yuri Vlasov from the People's Patriotic Party.
3. The last president of the USSR was Mikhail Gorbachev, who ran as an independent candidate.
4. Incumbent President Boris Yeltsin, also as an independent candidate.
5. State Duma deputy Vladimir Zhirinovsky from the LDPR party.
6. State Duma deputy Gennady Zyuganov from the Communist Party.
7. Member of the State Duma from the Congress of Russian Communities.
8. Ophthalmologist and State Duma deputy Svyatoslav Fedorov from the Workers' Self-Government Party.
9. Director of the Reform Foundation Martin Shakuum. This independent candidate, like Bryntsalov, managed to appeal the refusal of registration to the Supreme Court.
10. State Duma deputy Grigory Yavlinsky from the Yabloko party.

Another candidate, the head of the Kemerovo region, Aman Tuleev, withdrew his candidacy at the last moment in favor of Zyuganov.

Election campaign

One of the most striking in Russian history was the campaign before the 1996 presidential election. Yeltsin's entourage launched the "Vote or Lose" campaign, the president himself traveled a lot around the country, despite health problems, he participated in a large number of events.

The newspaper "God forbid!" became famous, which came out with a circulation of several million copies and was distributed free of charge. It criticized Zyuganov, frightening citizens with a probable Civil War if he won, mass arrests and executions, and starvation. Zyuganov was often compared to Hitler in publications.

Following the results of sociological research, the stake was placed on the population of large cities, youth and intelligentsia. A positive moment was the recognition by the current president of the mistakes made. As a result, Yeltsin kept his promise to stop hostilities in Chechnya in the near future.

First tour

In the first round, the turnout in the 1996 presidential elections in Russia was very high. 75,587,139 Russians took part in them, which is almost 70% of the country's population.

According to the voting results, 5 candidates at once failed to gain even 1% of the votes, losing to the "Against all" column (1.54%) and even the number of ballots declared invalid (1.43%). The worst result was demonstrated by Vladimir Bryntsalov, who received 123,065 votes. He was accompanied by Yuri Vlasov (0.2%), (0.37%), Mikhail Gorbachev (0.51%), Svyatoslav Fedorov (0.92%).

Fifth place was taken by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, more than 4 million Russians voted for him (5.7%), Grigory Yavlinsky was in fourth place (7.34%), and Alexander Lebed was in third (14.52%).

It was not possible to determine the winner in the first round. None of the candidates received more than half of the votes in the 1996 presidential elections in the Russian Federation. received only 32.03%, while Boris Yeltsin won a sensational victory with 35.28% of the vote.

As it turned out, Yeltsin's team made the right bet. He was mainly supported by the inhabitants of the two capitals, as well as the industrial centers of Siberia, the North of Russia, the Far East and in some national republics. Zyuganov was voted for in the depressed agricultural regions of the Chernozem region, Central Russia and the Volga region. The swan unexpectedly won in the Yaroslavl region.

Preparation for the second round

The second round was scheduled for Wednesday, July 3, 1996. It was declared a day off, everything was done in order to increase the turnout of people. Experts believed that Yeltsin had more potential supporters, but they, unlike the communists, were less active, so the increase in turnout was in the hands of the incumbent president.

There was a split in Yeltsin's headquarters itself. Chubais and a group of oligarchs were determined to win a second round, while the security forces, represented by the head of the presidential security service, Alexander Korzhakov, suggested postponing the second round or canceling the election altogether. The situation was aggravated due to a heart attack that Yeltsin had. Obviously, this was the result of a tense campaign.

Cygnus Support

General Lebed, who received almost 15% of the votes in the first round, became the owner of a decisive resource. It became clear that whoever was supported by his supporters would win.

Soon after the official summing up of the results of the first round, Yeltsin appointed Lebed to a high post. He becomes secretary of the Security Council, after which he officially called on his supporters to vote for the incumbent president. This predetermined the outcome of the struggle.

Election results

The voters in the second round showed high activity, more than 68% of Russians came to the polling stations.

Yeltsin was elected for a second term. His official inauguration took place on August 9, 1996.

© Vasily Avchenko

Chapter II. The effectiveness of political manipulations on practical examples (Russia in the 1990s)

§one. Elections of the President of the Russian Federation in 1996. "Family": victory at any cost

How cynical, disgusting, filthy, corrupt, fake. Yes, what I saw is more criminal than printing counterfeit money or killing people. Thieves, all thieves, on both sides. Thieves, deceivers, swindlers, forgers... Sellers, buyers and sorters of dead souls. "Holy" Russian democracy according to Chichikov. (E. Limonov about the 1996 presidential election).

The elections of 1996 are indicative for this work precisely because in their course the manipulative machine was used on a scale unprecedented for our country. The popularity of the winning candidate, Boris Yeltsin, by the beginning of 1996 was immeasurably lower than four years earlier, and the fact that this candidate managed to win the elections indicates a significant development of manipulative mechanisms in Russia. The election campaign of 1996, according to some experts, can become a textbook on the use of psychotechnologies in political advertising, and we agree with this opinion, adding that this campaign has become a textbook for the political technologists who conducted it, as it gave them a lot of experience and material for research. Therefore, in this paragraph, we will focus on B. Yeltsin's campaign and the factors that led to his victory.

The correlation of political forces on the eve of the elections and the final results

My God, what audacity one must have to seriously talk about free elections in Russia! To call "free" this symphony of fraud, this caricature of the people's will, this masterpiece of inequality of conditions, which the Bonapartes of all times and peoples, who excelled in such inventions in order to stay in power, can envy. ( Giulietto Chiesa)

Very few people believed that Yeltsin could legally retain power in 1996. Even the specialists of the American company MTV, who organized the Clinton campaign in 1992, refused to help the current president of the Russian Federation: “We cannot take risks, we can only participate in winning campaigns” (testifies S. Lisovsky). Yeltsin was extremely unpopular as a practical politician, as a result of whose activities the country sharply impoverished, lost production capacity and stood on the brink of a demographic, economic and geopolitical catastrophe; he was also unpopular as a person (remember the words of the French monster of political technologies Jacques Segel that people vote not for a program, but for a person) - Boris Yeltsin was no longer young, sick (it is now known that June 21, 1996, in the interval between the first and in the second round of the election, he almost died, having received a third heart attack as a result of overexertion and “pumping” with drugs), tongue-tied, deceitful, and simply unsympathetic - Yeltsin’s former charisma of the late 80s disappeared almost without a trace. The popularity rating of the incumbent president at the beginning of 1996, according to public opinion polls, was barely 3% (according to S. Lisovsky, 5%, according to other sources - up to 6%, but no more). Boris Yeltsin's opponents openly called him a "political corpse." The then party in power - "Our Home - Russia" - in the elections to the State Duma held in December 1995, won only 9.9% of the votes cast (the strongest of the opposition parties - the Communist Party - then became the first with 22.3%). “World experience, as far as I know, did not know such examples,” writes R. Boretsky. - A candidate with a 2-3% rating at the start comes in just a few months to the finish line as a triumph. And this is in a country of impoverished masses, practically abolished social benefits and guarantees, meager pensions - at one extreme and fabulous enrichment, unbridled theft and corruption, crime and a criminal war in Chechnya - at the other. And the winner is the personification of such a state and its first citizen. Nonsense. Irrationalism. This does not happen because it cannot be ... ".

The Kremlin political strategists faced a very difficult task: to "annul" in the public mind the weak and unpopular aspects of Yeltsin's personality and activities and to "index", to stick out the strong ones. The latter include the declared democratic orientation of Yeltsin's policy (the word "democracy" was still popular among the people), Yeltsin's personal strength, confidence, and "weightiness". In general, Boris Yeltsin by 1996 was a figure unacceptable to the broad masses of the population, but enjoyed the support of high financial circles.

Gennady Zyuganov by the beginning of 1996 had the highest popularity among the population among other public politicians. This is explained not so much by the personal qualities and merits of G. A. Zyuganov, but by the fact that he personified the best aspects of Soviet power (social guarantees, stability and real sovereignty of the country, etc.), was an alternative clearly not in favor of Yeltsin . In the figure of Zyuganov, many people saw the "bright past", the merits and victories of the Soviet government, which, against the backdrop of the destructive reforms of the 1990s, began to look especially contrasting.

Another strong figure is Alexander Lebed, whom a significant part of the population on the eve of the 1996 elections perceived as a non-communist, constructive alternative to Yeltsin. The image of the “iron general”, which was made popular by a series of film comedies by Alexander Rogozhkin (“Peculiarities of the National Hunt” and sequels), appealed to a lot of people - first of all, to that part of the electorate that could not classify itself as an orthodox communist, but did not recognize the radical liberal path either. market reforms according to Gaidar and Burbulis. However, after the announcement of the results of the first round, the true role of Alexander Lebed in the manipulative game became obvious (more on that below).

Grigory Yavlinsky was ideologically an ally of B. Yeltsin, but in this situation he became his rival, as he took away from him part of the votes of the democratically minded electorate (primarily those who supported market reforms, but did not really sympathize with Yeltsin's personality). Therefore, the personality of G. A. Yavlinsky during the period of preparation for the elections was subjected to a certain demonization by the Yeltsin team (Zyuganov's supporters, for example, did not make sense to reduce Yavlinsky's popularity).

Vladimir Zhirinovsky, whose Liberal Democratic Party had gained considerable popularity in his time, by 1996 was no longer at the zenith of his political glory. The population began to look at VV Zhirinovsky as a figure either unscrupulous or dependent - in a word, lightweight.

The rest of the candidates were weak figures, unable to make any serious competition to the leaders and could take only a very small number of votes. Recall that 11 candidates were admitted to the 1996 presidential elections (in the alphabetical list): V. Bryntsalov, Yu. Vlasov, M. Gorbachev, B. Yeltsin, V. Zhirinovsky, G. Zyuganov, A. Lebed, A. Tuleev, S. Fedorov, M. Shakkum, G. Yavlinsky.

Here are the official results of the first round, held on June 16, 1996 (68.7% of the voters voted):
B. Yeltsin - 35.8%
G. Zyuganov - 32.5%
A. Lebed - 14.7%
G. Yavlinsky - 7.4%
V. Zhirinovsky - 5.8%

Other candidates scored only 3% combined. Candidate Aman Tuleev refused to participate in the elections in favor of Gennady Zyuganov.

The official results of the second round, held on July 3, 1996 (voted 68.9% of the list of voters):

B. Yeltsin - 53.8%
G. Zyuganov - 40.3%
Against both candidates - 4.82%

Yeltsin's Election Campaign Tactics: Techniques, Emphasis, Vectors of Efforts

Elections are dramaturgy. The one who tells his people a piece of history is elected, and exactly the piece that the people want to hear about in this particular period of their historical development. (Jacques Seguela)

The goal facing the PR team of Yeltsin on the eve of the first round was to bring Yeltsin and a deliberately losing opponent into the second round. Since the most popular of the current politicians was Gennady Zyuganov, the main task was to belittle the image of Zyuganov along with the "elevation" of the image of Yeltsin. The whole tactical plan of Yeltsin's election campaign consisted of two main elements: to create a positive image of Yeltsin and to demonize the image of Zyuganov to the utmost. Having intimidated the population with the possibility of a "communist revenge", it is necessary to rally it around the democratic wing of politicians, and in order for the votes to be given specifically to Yeltsin, he must be made a candidate with no alternative. To do this, since 1993, the Yeltsin team began to discredit or directly remove from the political horizon the figures of Yeltsin's democratic competitors, and later some of them were denied registration of their candidacy (on the contrary, the nomination of left-wing, nationalist, radical candidates for elections was encouraged in every possible way, since they part of the votes of the traditional electorate of G. Zyuganov had to depart).

The political manipulation aimed at creating a positive image of Yeltsin was by no means limited to official election campaigning. The strongest administrative resource worked for Yeltsin, in addition, hidden "advertising" was present literally everywhere - this became possible due to the fact that in the hands of Yeltsin and the "family" there were truly incredible amounts and opportunities (in his memoirs "Presidential Marathon" Yeltsin is quite frankly writes how on the eve of the 1996 elections the most influential bankers came to him - Fridman, Khodorkovsky, Smolensky, Potanin and others: "Boris Nikolaevich, use all our resources, if only the elections end in your victory! Otherwise, the communists will come - they are on the streetlights for us outweigh ... "). Therefore, for example, there is an opinion that even the well-known series of commercials for the Imperial bank was intended to create the image of a somewhat eccentric, but wise and strong ruler. And there are many such examples. After all, humanity today lives in the information world no less than in the physical world, and in the field of information, dominance belonged to the president and his entourage.

All the major media supported B. Yeltsin - even "disinterestedly", because the political regime supported by Yeltsin was directly beneficial to them. As the current president, B. Yeltsin had the opportunity to issue decrees, enact laws and other regulatory documents that affect his popularity in various circles. Thus, the Federal Law “On Amendments and Additions to the Law of the Russian Federation on Taxes”, introduced on January 1, 1996, improved the financial situation of the media; the cooperation agreement signed in April 1996 with Kyrgyzstan, Belarus and Kazakhstan partly knocked the ground out from under the feet of the communists who were fighting for the revival of the USSR. During the same period, presidential decrees “On priority measures of state support for small businesses in the Russian Federation”, “On measures of state support for the Russian Public Fund for Disabled Military Service”, “On measures to improve social security ...”, “On measures to stabilize ...”, “On additional guarantees…”, etc. “The frankly propagandist nature of the overwhelming majority of these decrees and resolutions was successfully confirmed after the presidential elections, when B. Yeltsin, re-elected for a second term, signed a decree “On urgent measures to ensure an austerity regime in the federal budget process in the second half of 1996,” writes E. Popov. - This document suspended, and in some cases canceled 47 presidential decrees and government decrees, as well as some laws issued and adopted during the 1996 election campaign.

Other purely populist administrative measures also took place. In his memoirs, General Gennady Troshev, one of the commanders of the Russian troops during the Chechen war of 1994-96, writes that in May 1996 the federal forces achieved significant success in Chechnya: “During that period, many believed, and quite justifiably, that it is necessary to build on this success and complete the destruction of bandit groups as soon as possible. However, the federal government again changed the whole scenario, entering into a dialogue with the separatists, guided by political considerations - presidential elections were coming. Further, G. Troshev says that the agreement on the cessation of military operations on the territory of Chechnya, signed by Yeltsin together with the Chechen separatists, was not justified in the military and state sense: “We, the military, understood that this statement (Yeltsin - V.A. .) was purely opportunistic in nature and pursued the only goal - to attract the votes of voters. The "pacification" of 1996, as it became clear later, did not solve the Chechen problem.

Campaign "Vote or Lose": betting on youth.

In the materials of the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM), published in April 1996, it was noted that “the reserve of strength and a sense of their prospects among young people in general are such that the assessments of their own life situation among the young people surveyed are much more positive than among Russians on average » [cit. according to II, 28]. These materials gave reason to experienced advertisers to believe that if young people are attracted to the polls, then about 70% of their votes will be given to B. Yeltsin. “Thus,” write S. Lisovsky and V. Evstafiev, “the task of the advertising campaign was not to call for voting for a particular candidate, but to attract young people to the polls.” A fresh decision is not to try to reorient the existing opposition electorate, but to activate the "dead weight", the "swamp" - the youth. This traditionally considered passive political force, firstly, to a greater extent than the elderly, supports Western-style democratic power, and secondly, is more susceptible to the influence of advertising than the country's population as a whole (85% versus 66.2%). Now the political technologists faced a specific task: to develop a concept for an advertising campaign that could effectively influence young people - after all, according to public opinion polls, back in March 1996, half of the young people were not going to participate in the elections at all.

The campaign of US President B. Clinton in 1992 (Choose or lose - “Choose or lose”), organized by the MTV channel, was taken as a model. Even the name of the advertising campaign to promote B. Yeltsin ("Vote or lose") reminds of its American prototype. At the same time, K. Likutov, coordinator of the “Vote or Lose” campaign, noted that it was not a tracing paper, an exact reproduction of the American campaign: “An exclusive version was made”, that is, a specific national and historical context was taken into account. In the course of polls, young people most often called actors, showmen, and pop singers their highest authorities. “With this in mind,” says S. Lisovsky, “it was decided to address the youth through the rulers of their thoughts and hearts. Television was chosen as the main means of influence, the main actors were pop, rock, and movie stars. The popular youth channel MuzTV was widely used. Of course, the organizers did not bypass TV-6, NTV, RTR.

Characteristically, the campaign for Yeltsin was not frank, direct. Yeltsin's name might not have been mentioned at all, but no one had any doubts about the direction of the television commercials and slogans. A. Timofeevsky wrote in Kommersant on June 4, 1996: “The cycle addressed to the youth is based on the slogan “Vote or lose”. At the same time, on the word "lose" in the frame, either a cage or a beggar's hat appears - that is, what is associated specifically with the communists (note that most beggar's hats arose just after the fall of communist power - V.A.), although not a word was said about them. Whom to vote for is also said either in a half-hint, or not at all. Yeltsin's name may appear half-blacked out in the clip. Clips addressed to youth are fundamentally blurred.

It was precisely because of the orientation of Yeltsin's PR team towards young people that many popular actors, singers and other representatives of show business were attracted to the Vote or Lose campaign. Two music albums in the youth style were recorded - "Yeltsin is our president" and "Vote or lose." The performers of the songs on the first album were A. Malinin, T. Ovsienko, N. Rastorguev, A. Serov and others. The second album, representing dance music, was recorded in just 7 days by Sergey Minaev. The central composition was "Boris, fight!". Numerous campaign tours to the largest cities of Russia were also successful, during which singers and film artists urged young people to “make a free expression of will” (here, too, no one doubted that these people were calling to vote for Yeltsin). In the period between the first and second rounds of voting, Boris Yeltsin began to personally participate in traveling show-campaign performances (visited more than 10 major cities), showing himself to be an outstanding dancer and singer.

Simultaneously with the large-scale campaign "Vote or Lose", the advertising campaign "Choose with your heart" was carried out, organized by the advertising agency "Video International". It developed mainly television commercials and outdoor advertising. The Moskovsky Komsomolets newspaper spoke about the features of this campaign on July 31, 1996: “The offer to work“ for Yeltsin ”was received at the end of March, and already in the twenties of April, the agency presented to the headquarters“ A project for an advertising and campaign campaign for presidential candidate Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. M. Lesin headed the work. The main question that advertisers had to decide was who to target their products to. As project director D. Abroshchenko told the MK correspondent, in the end, the main goal of the campaign was to attract those 30% of voters to Yeltsin's side who had not decided who they were for - communists or democrats. Since such voters clearly did not reflect on which of the candidates was more worthy during the long winter evenings, the slogan "Choose with your heart" became the key phrase of the campaign. As you can see, even here the efforts of political technologists were directed at the "dead" part of the voters.

The specialists of Video International consciously "left" politics, economics and ideology (in this field, all the trump cards clearly belonged to the communists), focusing on emotions and ideals that everyone understands. The basis of the campaign was a series of commercials “I Believe. I love. Hope". Let us quote the Kommersant-Daily newspaper of May 29, 1996: “A whole“ social series ”, including several dozen commercials, allows not hired agitators, but ordinary people“ from the street ”to speak in support of Yeltsin: not very successful farmers, engineers from former orphans, old women in headscarves ".

It is characteristic that the words "did not give" to the representatives of precisely the social minority to whom Yeltsin's policy turned out to be beneficial (for example, bankers). On the contrary, the whole point was to make the viewer convinced: "a simple person", "the same as me", supports Yeltsin, despite all the troubles.

“This spectacular advertising move, of course, required considerable effort,” Kommersant-Daily continues. - The search for voluntary agitators for Yeltsin was carried out by several film crews, who some time ago dispersed to bearish corners. A. Timofeevsky noted: “This is not only a special Yeltsin electorate, but the entire possible electorate. Headmistress of the school (...). Voter of the first Yeltsin call (...). Old peasant woman (...) Pensioner (...). Retired Major (...). If they are all for Yeltsin, then he really is the "president of all Russians." The natural ending of each commercial was the words "I believe, I love, I hope" in the actual absence of the "advertised product" - Yeltsin - in the advertisement.

This "absence effect" made television advertising unobtrusive; besides, the appearance of a sick, mumbling Yeltsin could hardly be of any use. It also played into the hands of advertisers that only the incumbent president could afford not to appear in the frame due to fame. In posters and leaflets campaigning for B. Yeltsin, Video International also used the "absence effect": Yeltsin's face was not on outdoor advertising media. “A whole series of large posters was made in the style of television commercials,” Kommersant-Daily reports. - Collective photos of high school graduates, veterans, kindergarten children, workers from one enterprise. Photos taken from the archives of TASS, the Russian Committee of Veterans, the Museum of the Armed Forces. The fact that they are related to the advertised object is indicated only by the inscription “I believe. I love. Hope. Boris Yeltsin". And yet - a clarification at public transport stops: "Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin is the president of all Russians." We note here that only one of the candidates could afford such formulations. That candidate was the incumbent president.

Demonization of the main rival - G. Zyuganov.

In the campaign materials of Yeltsin's headquarters, as well as in the formally neutral ("informational") materials of the media supporting Yeltsin, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and its leader Gennady Zyuganov (although he did not go to the polls from the Communist Party, but from the Union of People's Patriotic Forces) were presented as people , eager to "put everyone in jail and shoot." Also, the thesis that if Zyuganov wins, a civil war will immediately begin has become a running one. Moreover, such messages were constantly repeated, varied, “hollowed a stone with a frequent fall” in all major media. “Tension was whipped up by all television, we will show total devotion to the president,” writes Mikhail Nazarov. - The traditional division between news and commentary in journalism has disappeared. There wasn't an hour of TV time to waste, including rhetoric in entertainment programs and feature films about the horrors of the communist era. Presidential aide G. Satarov announced the existence of "red combat detachments", Mayor Yu. Luzhkov attributed to the Communists an attempt on his deputy V. Shantsev and an explosion in the subway. (By the way, these were very strange explosions that increased the tension on Yeltsin's hand ...) ".

And here are the words of Gleb Pavlovsky, head of the Effective Policy Foundation, who, under a contract with Yeltsin's headquarters, carried out "counter-propaganda work in the regional media": There was a civil war in the information space (...). The voter was told: the communists want to take something from you personally: an apartment, a land plot, $500 sewn up in a stocking” [cit. according to II, 23]. The purpose of the counter-propaganda campaign was not to convince the voters that Boris Yeltsin was good and worthy of a second presidential term, but to create a feeling that there was no alternative and that his victory was predetermined. Zyuganov found himself in the position of constantly making excuses and defending himself (“... In the era of glasnost, bullets made of shit are the most deadly!” says KGB veteran Leonid Shebarshin).

We repeat that this was possible only under the conditions of the government's monopoly on the media, primarily television. A special anti-advertising newspaper called “God forbid!” Was also created, which was distinguished by high-quality printing. Alexander Melkov testifies: “Expensive, but effective. Even those who scolded the first numbers, looked for and read the next ones. Talented journalists did their best to butcher Zyuganov's team and along the way the entire bloc of people's patriotic forces, albeit sometimes dishonestly, but still not quite miserable, like "Soviet Russia". An excellent move was the strips with photomontages of the leader of the Communist Party, which seemed to be asking for a wall (for which, in fact, they were intended). In many institutions, especially where many companies coexist, everything was sealed with them - from offices to toilets. And each appearance of the main communist was endowed with a certain symbolism, conveyed by selected emotionally colored images and corresponding attributes.

Before the second round of elections, the strategy “Communism - war and famine” was added to all this, which directly echoed the biological sense of self-preservation and the need for food” [cit. according to II, 23]. In the room "God forbid!" dated May 18, 1996, Zyuganov was compared to Hitler, which has long been a common technique used by Kremlin technologists to demonize the enemy (the American sociologist G. Bloomer calls such methods “the use of emotional attitudes and prejudices that people already possess” [quoted from II, 7]); in this case, the persistent rejection of the word "fascist" by the Russian people was exploited). The same issue featured an anti-communist interview with Santa Barbara fan idol Martinez, who played the role of Cruz Castillo. In short, the operation called “Beat Zyuganov” was carried out diligently and thoughtfully.

The complex of manipulative methods also included behind-the-scenes personnel movements. So, after the announcement of the results of the first round of voting, it became clear that the real role of Alexander Lebed is not an alternative to Yeltsin, but Yeltsin's "ambush regiment". Those who voted for Lebed in the first round voted for Yeltsin in the second, and this was most likely planned by Yeltsin's headquarters in advance. But Zyuganov, in principle, could get the same votes - many saw Lebed as a “strong hand”, “army order”, that is, values ​​that are largely inherent in the ideology of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. Probably, the figure of Alexander Lebed was destined for this role in advance - to be considered a “national patriot”, a “statesman” (as both Russian and foreign media tirelessly called him), without actually being one, and thereby take votes away from Zyuganov. “Not only did Lebed not have to leave the game for the sake of Yeltsin’s victory (which Yavlinsky was pushed hard to do by all means), but, on the contrary, to gain more votes,” J. Chiesa wrote after the elections. - Because it was clear that Lebed would be able to take votes not from Yeltsin, but most likely from Zyuganov, while Yavlinsky takes them only from Yeltsin. Thus, Lebed will help Yeltsin to win in the first round, then (...) he will be persuaded to give Yeltsin the votes of his electors in the second round, and in the end he himself will be thrown out. Everyone knows that this plan was a success.

Taking into account that in the first round Zyuganov almost caught up with Yeltsin (32.5% and 35.8%, respectively), and Lebed came third (14.7%), we can say with confidence that the outcome of the second round largely depended on who will vote Lebed. He gave them to Yeltsin, and this determined the victory of the latter (in the second round, Yeltsin, as we know, scored 53.8%, and Zyuganov - 40.3%). By the way, even between the first and second rounds of voting, the well-known sociologist and writer Alexander Zinoviev said that Yeltsin's victory was "programmed" for the second round - in the first it would have been "sewn with white thread." Then A. Zinoviev said that the alliance between Lebed and Yeltsin was easily predictable.

Another example is the registration of presidential candidates: since the Central Election Commission was under the influence of the president, this structure did everything possible to make the list of candidates look “right”. Registration was denied under formally legal pretexts to those who were ideologically and politically close to Yeltsin, which means that they could take away a part (albeit a small one) of his votes. On the contrary, potential "takers" of Zyuganov's votes were registered with a bang.

Let's give the floor to Eduard Limonov, who participated in the election campaign of Yuri Vlasov: “The reason for the refusal to register one on the Starovoitova board is as clear as daylight. She, being on the lists of candidates, takes away votes from Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin. That's why they threw her away. Inventing that her forgery (we are talking about accusing Starovoitova of forging signature sheets - V.A.) is worse than others (...). Aman Tuleev, naturally, he will take away votes from Zyuganov, they register on the fly (...). It is clear as daylight that Vlasov was registered so elegantly because he will take away votes from Zyuganov. If it were expected that he would take votes from Yeltsin, then the rejection rate would be, if necessary, like that of Starovoitova. And if necessary - and above. In the play "Dead Souls" everything is a lie. "Russian Thought" in 1996 analyzed the same personnel manipulations: from the political arena in 1993-95. Yegor Gaidar "associates" was removed, and Grigory Yavlinsky was discredited, as far as possible. Of course, there were some blunders: for example, Viktor Anpilov, who “did not live up to the Kremlin’s hopes,” did not begin to nominate himself, and the already registered Aman Tuleev preferred to withdraw his candidacy at the last moment in favor of Zyuganov.

Purely power techniques that remained unclaimed.

The fact that the Yeltsin team was ready, using the power it had, to apply completely illegitimate methods of struggle to preserve the throne, is evidenced by many facts. Already on March 17, 1996, as a result of complications with the collection of signatures for the registration of B. Yeltsin, the State Duma as the "headquarters of the opposition" was blocked by troops, but then the Minister of Internal Affairs intervened. At a well-known press conference on June 20, 1996, Anatoly Chubais, the head of Yeltsin's election headquarters, confirmed that the associates of the incumbent president - Deputy Prime Minister Soskovets, Minister of State Security Barsukov, head of the presidential guard Korzhakov - were preparing a "power option" to cancel the elections. A. Korzhakov told later in his book how he warned the communist representative Zorkaltsev: “Look, guys, don’t joke, we won’t give up power ... You realized that we had serious intentions when the Duma was seized on the 17th. So...let's have a good deal. Maybe we can share some portfolios. Nevertheless, Yeltsin needed not only power, but also its formal legitimacy, which forced the president's team to focus their main efforts on the actual election manipulations and agitation.

Characteristic features of the election campaign of B. Yeltsin and its significance

The electorate of the psychiatric hospital No. 1 named after P. P. Alekseev, as always, demonstrated an enviable electoral activity (...). The overwhelming majority of voters (...) gave their votes to Boris Yeltsin. ("Today", July 5, 1996)

When identifying the main features of B. N. Yeltsin's election campaign, the first thing that catches the eye is the complex approach of the headquarters of this candidate to the choice of means of influencing the course of the elections. Yeltsin's political technologists fought, if such a comparison is appropriate here, on all fronts. They prepared campaign materials, large-scale PR shows, counter-propaganda, kept the Central Election Commission under control, the largest media, developed various options for action in accordance with one or another change in the situation.

All this would have been completely impossible if Yeltsin and the "family" did not have the so-called administrative resource, in other words, state power. “The most effective, powerful and, perhaps, the only weapon that B. Yeltsin had during the presidential election campaign was state power,” says E. Popov. - The closest associates of the incumbent head of state staked on it, rightly believing that not only authority contributes to gaining power, but also the skillful use of power contributes to gaining authority. Authority means popularity, and popularity is a necessary condition for winning an election.”

To the administrative resource, we will include monopoly influence on the media, the privilege of "creating informational occasions", the ability to quickly fabricate ostentatious "popular decrees". “Administrative resource” is also a privilege to violate with impunity the articles of the Federal Law “On the Elections of the President of the Russian Federation” (we are talking about equal access to the media for all candidates, a ban on government agencies to engage in campaigning, etc. - points on which the Yeltsin team went for clear violations). This is also the possibility of pressure on the regions (for example, 11 regions dramatically changed their preferences in the second round by voting for Yeltsin, as if the entire electorate had been replaced).

The topics of falsification of ballots and similar frauds are not covered here due to the lack of reliable information. Nevertheless, assumptions about elementary fraud during the counting of ballots were expressed more than once; it cannot be ruled out that Yeltsin's campaign headquarters had this tool in mind as well. It can be conditionally attributed to the manipulation of the owners of the administrative resource. Obviously, it was Yeltsin's team that was in the most advantageous conditions here.

Characteristically, many organizers of the campaign worked not so much on commission as on their own initiative. The owners of the largest fortunes were interested in Yeltsin's victory and spared no expense. Specialists-advertisers themselves offered their services. Their interests ultimately coincided with the goals of the campaign they organized, and they worked in good faith. Yeltsin did not have any money or specialists during the campaign. An interesting trick of Yeltsin's political technologists was the focus on the politically passive youth, which we discuss in detail above.

The main psychological argument of Yeltsin's agitation was the opposition of "freedom and democracy with Yeltsin" and "hunger, civil war and camps with Zyuganov." Thus, a conviction was created that there was no alternative to Yeltsin's candidacy. According to analyst L. Prokhorova, during the campaign, “the psychological and psycholinguistic impact on a certain audience was skillfully calculated, the “pain points” of Russians were well understood, and this was the reason for the creation of certain “microimages”. This was achieved, in our opinion, firstly, by selecting special groups of direct appeals, taking into account audience segmentation; the creation of given emotional images through the use of the phenomena of polysemy; giving dynamics to texts and expressiveness - narration through the use of borrowed words that are quite new or exotic for perception by the Russian audience. All this corresponds to the symbolic nature of the advertising text, the effective semiotic and psycholinguistic impact of the text on the audience. according to II, 28].

Yeltsin was indeed “voted with the heart,” that is, with emotions, but not with reason. The actions of Yeltsin's PR people, which "inflated" the rating of their client, were not calculated on a reasonable perception. They were aimed at emotional perception, at the subconscious - and that is why they should be called manipulation, not persuasion. Here is what S. Lisovsky and V. Evstafiev write: “From the beginning to the end of the advertising campaign, the basic principle was maintained - “Do not force, but offer.” The chosen methodology of influencing the youth audience turned out to be very effective. Its implementation brought the expected results. Two-thirds of the young people who were not going to vote went to the polls. About 80% of these young people responded in opinion polls that they decided to vote under the influence of the "Vote or Lose" campaign. Needless to say, they voted mostly for Yeltsin.

Such a large-scale manipulative action, which Yeltsin's election campaign appears in the light of the cited materials, implies a significant number of organizers - both advertising and manipulative specialists (performers) and customers.

Whom should we thank (with or without quotation marks - a matter of personal choice of each) for the outcome of the 1996 presidential election? This is, firstly, the Effective Policy Foundation under the leadership of Gleb Pavlovsky, sometimes referred to in the press as a “dream factory”. This is, secondly, the Premier-SV advertising agency, headed by Sergei Lisovsky. It is interesting that at first this company acted on its own initiative, without coordinating its steps with the election headquarters of B. Yeltsin. Only then did the efforts of the headquarters and the advertising agency unite in a common campaign. S. Lisovsky and V. Evstafiev write: “The leadership of Premier SV sent its proposals for the campaign to the election headquarters of the President of the Russian Federation, headed by O. Soskovets. The initiative of the "premier" found support from the headquarters. However, A. Chubais soon headed it, and the Premier SV proposal was temporarily postponed. A month later (in mid-March 1996), the leadership of the Premier SV received a call from the presidential headquarters and offered to discuss a program of joint actions. From that moment on, the organizers of the Vote or Lose campaign have already worked together with the President’s headquarters, coordinating events, dates, etc.” .

Here is what the Financial Times reported on February 18, 2002 in “Anatoly Chubais Dinner with The FT” (translated by www.inopressa.ru): which they had to pay very little. The Russians also blamed Chubais for this. “If I were in that situation again,” he says, “I would make exactly the same decision.” It was a "fundamental historic decision". The ensuing looting of assets was "the price we paid to keep the communists out of the country". In a number of issues of the Collection of Legislation of the Russian Federation, presidential orders were published to encourage active participants in Yeltsin's election campaign. Among the most high-profile names of these paid and free assistants to Yeltsin are P. Aven, A. Bevz, B. Berezovsky, A. Goldstein, P. Gusev, V. Gusinsky, Yu. Lesin, S. Lisovsky, V. Malkin, G. Pavlovsky, V. Potanin, E. Ryazanov, E. Sagalaev, A. Smolensky, V. Starkov, M. Fridman, M. Khodorkovsky, V. Shumeiko, T. Dyachenko, I. Malashenko, A. Chubais, S. Shakhrai, A. Kulikov, G. Melikyan, Yu. Shafrannik, S. Shoigu and others.

D. Abroshchenko, A. Gurevich and others worked on commercials and outdoor advertising for candidate Yeltsin. Active assistance in the campaign "Vote or lose" was provided by the radio station "Europe Plus", the production center of Stas Namin, the firm "Ars", the newspaper "Komsomolskaya Pravda" . From the Italian publicist Giulietto Chiesa we find information about American specialists helping Yeltsin (“It was an American victory in the full sense of the word”). The same was reported on July 15, 1996 by the influential American weekly "Time" ("Yeltsin's Rescue. A story that reveals the secret of how four American advisers, using public opinion polls, the work of analytical groups, advertising errors and some technical tricks of the American electoral system, helped defeat Boris Yeltsin.

The paragraph concludes with several assessments of the results of the presidential elections in the Russian Federation in 1996.

S. Lisovsky and V. Evstafiev: “With a rather low initial rating of B. N. Yeltsin, public opinion was turned in his direction. This testifies to the enormous power of the impact of pre-election political communications with the right strategy and creativity. The second conclusion that the work carried out allows us to draw is the conclusion about the importance of the precise targeting of advertising and the chosen methods. In this case, the youth audience was unmistakably chosen as the object of influence; way of influence - an appeal to emotions, to the subconscious. We emphasize once again: it is important that specific decisions were not imposed on young people, but it was proposed to make a free choice. It remains for us to state that this is a classic example of manipulation, hidden influence, when there really is an illusion of “free choice” (in fact, of course, Yeltsin’s campaign did not offer any free choice). Sergei Shakhrai, a member of Yeltsin's campaign headquarters, laid out the campaign's effectiveness factors as follows: "The technology of advertising (...) or holding mass actions has a simple methodology: 50% science, 50% talent and a hell of a lot of daily work" [cit. according to II, 28].

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, July 5, 1996: “A new powerful weapon of political struggle has appeared in the hands of Russian politicians - the so-called modern political technologies. Of course, they existed and were used before. But only the current presidential elections have fully demonstrated their strength and capabilities. For it was precisely the modern political technologies used by professionals that ensured the victory of Boris Yeltsin. according to II, 23]. Indeed, one of the features of the presidential campaign was that its tactics were developed entirely by advertising professionals; in other words, the elections have become an ordinary, though far from ordinary, industry, they have been “put on stream”.

Publicist Valery Khatyushin: “The Russian people were deceived in the meanest way. With the help of an information stranglehold, he was simply forced to elect a broken doll, an indistinctly mooing mummy, for president.

Ukrainian specialist in the field of PR G. Pocheptsov: "The presidential campaign in Russia in 1996 demonstrated a real triumph of professional image makers" . This author also cites the following collective opinion of a group of analysts from the book “Russia at the Critical Line: Revival or Catastrophe”: “The astonishing upward jump in B. N. Yeltsin’s rating, achieved literally in 2-3 pre-election months, is a paradoxical and unique phenomenon in politics. Yeltsin's victory was ensured not only by the infusion of money, the skill of the team of image-makers and B. Yeltsin's instinct for power. It also affected the actual paralysis of public consciousness due to shock attacks by power structures and the media, the moral and informational blocking of the will of voters by an energetic and total campaign of fear and promises” [cit. according to II, 26].

Publicist Mikhail Nazarov: “The 1996 elections demonstrated to the surprised Russia the possibilities of modern technologies for manipulating the “people's will”. The winners did not even hide the fact that they succeeded by the same far from the truth psychological methods of the advertising business, by which people are persuaded to drink Coca-Cola or buy stale goods.

It can be stated that most analysts, both "left" and "right", agree that the election of the President of the Russian Federation in 1996 is, first of all, a victory for the Yeltsin's manipulative machine and the "family". Another thing is that representatives of various political camps consider this fact from sometimes opposite points of view and give it an appropriate assessment. However, one cannot but agree with Sergei Lisovsky, who said that the 1996 election campaign was "unprecedented in terms of the scale of tasks, in terms of its historical significance for Russia."